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Recent  progress  in  the  evolutionary  understanding  of  behavior  may  greatly  assist  psychiatry. 
Although  explanations  of  psychopathology  have  traditionally  emphasized  proximate  causes  of 
individual  differences,  consideration  of  the  evolutionary  functions  of  human  behavior  is essential 
for  psychiatry,  just  as  biology,  ethology,  and  medicine  routinely  consider  both  proximate  and 
evoluGonary  explanations  for  a  variety  of  phenomena.  The  methods  and  data  for  testing  evolu- 
tionary  hypotheses  are  reviewed,  and  the  ways  in which  evoluGonary  principles  can  help  to  explain 
maladaptive  behaviors  are  considered.  Some  psychiatric  symptoms  that  seem  maladaptive  may, 
in fact,  serve  specific  survival  functions.  Hypotheses  are  proposed  about  the  possible  evoluGonary 
significance  of  overeating,  anorexia  nervosa,  panic  attacks,  and  sexual  disorders,  and  tests  of 
these  hypotheses  are  considered.  By  incorporating  an  evolutionary  perspective  on  psychopath- 
ology,  psychiatry  may  share  the  foundation  that  evolution  provides  for  the  rest  of  natural  science. 
I 
N  THE  PAST  ten  years,  evolutionary  theory  has  gained  substantial  new  power 
to  explain  behaviors  and  social  structures.’  Unanswered  problems  from  Darwin’s 
time  have  finally  been  solved,  and  a whole  class  of new  hypotheses  is being  generated 
and  tested.  Milestones  for  this  progress  include  Hamilton’s  1968  formulation  of 
the  principle  of  inclusive  fitness,  and  the  1975  publication  of  Wilson’s  Sociobiol- 
ogy.z-3 The  exponential  growth  since  1975  of  publications  in  this  area,  attests  to 
the  impact  of  these  new  ideas.  The  evolutionary  study  of  behaviors  and  social 
structures  is  quickly  becoming  an  independent  discipline.  This  new  power  of  ev- 
olutionary  theory  to  explain  human  behavior  has  not  been  widely  appreciated  or 
utilized  by  psychiatry.  Yet,  the  application  of evolutionary  principles  to  psychiatric 
phenomena  makes  new  questions  possible  and  provides  a framework  for  integrating 
the  seemingly  diverse  levels  of  the  biopsychosocial model.  The  territory  of  evolu- 
tionary  psychobiology  is  large,  so  this  presentation  must  be  limited  to  an  outline 
of  the  logic  of  evolutionary  explanations  in  psychiatry,  and  some  examples  that 
illustrate  the  benefits  and  problems  of testing  evolutionary  hypotheses  about  specific 
psychiatric  conditions. 
For  every  biological  phenomenon,  two  different  kinds  of  causes  must  be  under- 
stood.  Proximate  (immediate)  causes  are  those  that  explain  a  structure  or  event  in 
an  individual  organism.  Ultimate (evolutionary)  causes  are  those  that  explain  the 
existence  of  a  structure  or  capacity  in  all  members  of  a  species.4  Why  does  the 
firefly  glow?  The  proximate  causes  are  the  environmental  precipitants,  and  the 
sensory,  neural,  and  chemical  mechanisms  that  result  in  the  flash  of  light.  The 
question  of  ultimate  cause  may  be  answered  only  by  explaining  the  evolutionary 
function  of  the  capacity  to  glow,  and  the  way  that  this  capacity  has  increased 
survival  or  reproduction  in  the  face  of  specific  forces  of  natural  selection.5 
Psychiatry  has  been  preoccupied  with  proximate  explanations,  and  only  rarely 
has  considered  ultimate  explanations  .69 “Why  do  people  experience  anxiety?’  The 
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question  is usually  answered  in terms of the proximate  precipitants  and mechanisms, 
physiological  and  psychological.  But  we must  also  understand  why  the  capacity 
for  anxiety  evolved  in humans.  Why  do essentially  all humans  experience  jealousy, 
grief,  and  loneliness?  Both  the  ultimate  and  the  proximate  causes  need  to  be 
understood  for  every  evolved  human  capacity. 
In  biology,  ethology,  and  medicine,  evolutionary  explanations  are  not  only  ac- 
cepted,  they  are  mandatory.  Biologists,  too,  were  once  wary  of  evolutionary  ex- 
planations.  Ultimate  causes  are  now  sought  even  in  physiology  and  molecular 
biology,  where  homologous  hormones  and  DNA  sequences  in  vastly  different 
species require  evolutionary  explanation.  i” Ernst  Mayr,  in  The  Growth of Biological 
Thought,  goes  so  far  as to  define  two  biologies:  the  study  of  proximate  causes  is 
one,  the  study  of ultimate  causes  is the  other.4  He  emphasizes  the  legitimacy  and 
importance  of  both.  In  Ethology,  Hinde  states  four  necessary  kinds  of  questions 
about  the  behavior:  (1) What  is the  immediate  cause  of the  behavior?  (2) What  is 
the  ontogenetic  history  of  the  behavior?  (3) What  is the  evolutionary  function  of 
the  behavior?  (4) What  is the  phylogenetic  history  of  the  behavior?”  Answers  to 
all four  questions  are  essential  to  fully  explain  any  behavior,  animal  or  human. 
In  medicine,  considerations  of  evolutionary  function  are  so  taken  for  granted 
that  they  can  be  hard  to  recognize.  The  circulatory  system,  the  immune  system, 
and  the  digestive  system  are  each  defined  by  their  evolved  function.  The  internist 
recognizes  syndromes  by the  typical  pathophysiology  which  results  when  the func- 
tion  of  a  specific  system  is  disrupted.  Treatment  may  be  possible  on  this  basis, 
even  if  the  etiology  is  unknown.  Psychiatry,  because  it  does  not  recognize  the 
analogous  behavioral  adaptive  systems,  is forced  to search for either  specific etiology 
or  empirical  treatment. 
The  problems  encountered  in testing  hypotheses  about  the evolutionary  function 
of  human  traits  are  real  but  surmountable.  This  issue  is  most  comprehensively 
assessed  by Alexander  in Darwinism  and  Human  Affairs.12 The  principle  that  every 
capacity  in every  species has an evolutionary  function,  has some limits.  Also,  there 
is no  direct  fossil  record  of behavior,  and  the  human  species  is a special  case.  But 
the  basic  principles  of  evolution  apply  equally  well  to  behavioral  and  emotional 
capacities  in all  species. i3 The  benefits  and  problems  of evolutionary  explanations 
are  best  considered  using  specific  examples,  but  some  general  issues must  ‘first be 
reviewed. 
The  logical  pattern  for  an evolutionary  analysis  of a psychiatric  phenomenon  is 
essentially  the  same  as the  pattern  for’analysis  of any  behavior:  , 
1. Define  the  phenomenon  to  be explained. 
2. Explicate  the proximal  causes (environmental,  psychological,  and neurochemical). 
3. Hypothesize  possible ‘ultimate  causes. 
4. Drive  predictions  from  these  hypotheses. 
5. Test  the  predictions  against  the  data. 
6. If the  phenomenon  is not  an adaptation,  but  is thought  to  represent  pathology, 
then  find  the  level,  nature,  and  etiology  of the  defect  in the  functional  adaptive 
system  affected. 
Definition  of the  phenomenon  and  explication  of  the’proximate  causal  chain  is 
the  usual  pattern  of  explanations  in  psychiatry.  Environmental  precipitant&  neu- 
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consideration  of these  factors,  especially  the  interactions  between  the  environmental 
situation  and  the  behavior,  some  clues  usually  emerge  about  the  evolutionary 
function  of the  phenomenon,  and  a hypothesis  may  be  proposed.  Testing  hypotheses 
about  evolutionary  functions  of  behavior  is  essentially  the  same  as  for  other  traits 
and  structures.  Evidence  of  three  kinds  can  be  brought  to  bear:  (1)  contextual 
observations,  (2)  comparative  method,  and  (3)  experiment. 
Contextual  observation  is  the  method  of  ethology.  10*14  This  discipline  has  so  far 
contributed  most  of  the  evolutionary  perspective  available  on  psychiatry.‘5-‘8  Evi- 
dence  is  provided  by  environmental  and  internal  states  that  elicit  the  behavior,  by 
the  details  of  the  behavior  itself,  and  by  the  effects  which  result  from  the  behavior. 
If correct,  the  hypothesis  should  be consistent  with  this  evidence,  and  should  predict 
additional  details  and  correlates.  For  behavior,  the  comparative  method  cannot 
rely  on  fossil  evidence,  but  differences  between  similar  behavior  patterns  in  related 
species  should  be  predicted  by  the  specific  ecological  adaptations  made  by  each 
species. 
The  experimental  method  can  provide  evidence  when  a capacity  is disrupted  and 
observations  are  made  of  the  extent  and  reason  for  subsequent  decreased  fitness. 
Genetic,  surgical,  and  drug  effects  can  be  used,  but  it  is  always  hard  to  be  sure 
that  the  intervention  has  not  accidentally  confounded  other  variables.  The  first 
stage  of  hypothesis  testing  often  involves  naturalistic  observations  which  predict 
the  adaptive  consequences  of  depriving  an  organism  of  a  capacity. 
The  issue  of  pathology  must  be  confronted  before  specific  examples  are  consid- 
ered.  Well  and  good,  one  might  say,  that  evolution  can  provide  explanations  of 
normal  behavior.  But  abnormal  behavior,  by  definition,  has  no  adaptive  function. 
How  can  an  evolutionary  perspective  help  us  to  explain  psychopathology?  First, 
it  defines  normality  according  to  the  adaptive  consequences  of  a  behavior  pattern, 
without  reference  to  the  usual  criteria  of  “freedom  from  distress,”  “interference 
with  functioning,”  or  “statistical  abnormality.”  Second,  many  symptoms  can  be 
recognized  as  distressing,  but  adaptive.  Pain  is  unpleasant,  almost  by  definition. 
Yet  the  early  death  of  people  who  lack  the  capacity  for  pain,  makes  the  adaptive 
function  of  this  system  clear.  I9 Nausea  and  vomiting  are  equally  aversive,  but 
individuals  who  did  not  have  these  capacities,  must  often  have  died  of  poisoning 
and  infection.  Cough  is another  protective  reflex.  The  very  fact  that  these  experiences 
are  so  unpleasant  may  be  a  result  of  evolution.  These  symptoms  are  often  elicited 
by  a  threat  to  homeostasis,  yet  they  are  not  in  themselves  pathological,  but  are 
normal  evolved  defenses  against  pathology.  Is  anxiety  another  example?  Though 
unpleasant,  it  seems  to  be  a  universal  capacity  that  is  reliably  elicited  by  very 
specific  situations.  This  suggests  that  it,  too,  may  be  an  evolved  capacity  with  an 
adaptive  function.  Other  human  emotional  capacities  meet  the  same  criteria: 
loneliness,  guilt,  grief,  jealousy,  fatigue,  and  boredom. 
Finally,  there  are  phenomena  that  are  not  universal  capacities  and  those  that  are 
maladaptive  even  from  an  evolutionary  perspective.  One  approach  has  been  to 
ignore  this  distinction  and  insist  that  there  is  a  function  for  everything.  But,  to 
blithely  assume  adaptive  functions  for  schizophrenia,  endogenous  depression,  sui- 
cide,  and  child  abuse,  makes  a  mockery  of  the  evolutionary  perspective.  Proposed 
functions  must  be  justified  in  terms  of their  impact  on  genetic  fitness.  Just  because 
we  all  have  the  capacity  for  psychosis,  does  not  make  it  adaptive.  We  all  have  the 578  RANDOLPH  M.  NESSE 
capacity  for  a  positive  Babinski  sign,  but  this  is a  release  phenomenon,  not  an 
evolutionary  adaptation.  For  a pathological  symptom  or  syndrome  it is necessary 
to: (1) Identify  the adaptive  system involved;  (2) Explicate  the proximate  mechanism 
that  normally  operates  the  system;  (3) Identify  the  locus,  nature,  and  etiology  of 
the  specific  defect  in  that  system;  and  (4)  Assess  the  effect  of  that  defect  on  the 
adaptive  function  of the system.  In particular,  disruptions  of a control  system  need 
to  be  distinguished  from  more  fundamental  disruptions  of  the  capacity  itself.  In 
most  mental  illness, normal  human  emotions  and  behavior  patterns  are elicited  too 
early  or  late,  too  intensely  or  mildly,  or  in  response  to  the  wrong  stimulus.  In 
others,  the  capacity  is absent,  or  the  response  is fundamentally  deformed. 
It may  be helpful  to emphasize  what  is not being  argued.  It is not  proposed  that 
genetic  differences  explain  an individual’s  behavior.  And  it is not  proposed  that  all 
behavior  is innate. The capacity  for individual  learning  is present  in so many  species 
precisely  because  it  affords  such  a  substantial  selective  advantage.  The  thesis  is, 
instead,  that  almost  every  behavior  and  emotional  capacity  and  tendency  shared 
by  all  humans,  is a  result  of  evolution,  and  therefore  serves  an  adaptive  function 
that  increases  the  survival  and  reproduction  of that  individual’s  genes. 
Eating  disorders  are  among  the  most  common,  most  treated,  and  most  studied 
of  psychiatric  problems,  yet  the  adaptive  functions  of  eating  and  satiety,  and  the 
evolution  of  the  responsible  mechanisms,  are  rarely  considered.  What  selective 
pressures  shaped  the  mechanism  that  controls  the  quantity  of  food  consumed? 
There  are  two  motivating  forces,  hunger  and  satiety,  each  with  specific  evolved 
anatomic  localization  and  neurohumoral  control.  For  hunger,  the  selective  forces 
are clear.  An organism  that  does  not  eat,  quickly  dies, and  its genes are eliminated 
from  the  pool.  Furthermore,  periods  of  limited  food  supply  have  selected  for  the 
capacity  to  store  fat,  and  the  behavioral  tendency  to eat enough  to  fill these  stores 
when  necessary.  Pregnancy  is  one  condition  in  which  additional  fat  stores  are 
particularly  adaptive.  Females  with  the  capacity  and  tendency  to  store  additional 
fat  during  pregnancy,  are  able  to  nurse  their  infants  through  a famine;  the  infants 
of mothers  who  do not  gain weight  often  die. The  clinical  observation  that  obesity 
often  begins  with  pregnancy  or  the  administration  of birth  control  pills  supports 
this hypothesis.  Detailed  analysis  of the  responsible  mechanism  should  be possible. 
But how  could  the satiety  mechanism  augment  survival?  Large  individuals  needs 
more  food  to  sustain  themselves,  and  will  therefore  provide  less  for  their  mates 
and  offspring.  They  will also  be  slower  and  therefore  less effective  as hunters  and 
more  vulnerable  as prey. 
Why  are  there  more  overweight  than  underweight  people  in  the  industrial  SO- 
cieties?  Proximate  explanations  look  at  the  food  types  and  availability,  and  at 
energy  expenditure,  but  the  ultimate  explanation  is  that  some  natural  selection 
forces  have  shaped  a hunger  system  that  absolutely  ensures  adequate  food  intake, 
while  other  selection  forces  have  shaped  a  satiety  mechanism  that  is  feeble  by 
comparison. 
Anorexia  nervosa  is more  clearly  pathological,  yet  the  remarkable  consistency 
of this  syndrome  suggests  the  presence  of a possible  adaptive  mechanism.  Patients 
usually  describe  a  period  of  strict  dieting,  followed  by  an  overwhelming  fear  of 
obesity  that  is  associated  with  preoccupation  with  food,  and  fear  of  gorging  or 
actual  episodes  of  bulimia. **  A speculative  hypothesis  emerges.  Does  there  exist  a EVOLUTIONARY  PERSPECTIVE  ON  PSYCHIATRY  579 
mechanism,  evolved  after  millions  of  years  of  feast  and  famine,  that  prepares 
individuals  for  periods  of  food  shortage,  by  inducing  eating  behavior  to  store 
calories?  Diet-induced  hypoglycemia  could  elicit  this  behavior  pattern  and  result 
in  impulses  to  gorge.  Women  with  a  socially  induced  fear  of  obesity  and  a  strong 
ability  to  resist  impulses,  might  try  to  control  their  weight  by  more  strict  dieting, 
thus  setting  up  a  positive  feedback  cycle  that  would  make  things  still  worse.  This 
has  obvious  implications  for  obesity.  Can  dieting  cause  obesity?  Perhaps.  This 
hypothesis  gives  rise  to  the  nonobvious  testable  prediction  that,  in  many  species, 
individuals  exposed  to  periods  of  food  deprivation  should  gain  more  weight  than 
otherwise  identical  individuals  given  continuous  access  to  food.  The  hypothesis 
seems  less  farfetched  when  one  considers  the  many  species  that  respond  to  envi- 
ronmental  cues  anticipating  the  hibernation  season  by  gaining  large  amounts  of 
weight. 
Panic  disorder  is another  very  consistent  syndrome.  21  Patients  with  panic  disorder 
report  attacks  coming  “out  of  the  blue,”  that  begin  with  overwhelming  terror  and 
perhaps  a  moment  of  immobility.  In  seconds,  patients  experience  palpitations, 
shortness  of  breath,  sweating,  an  empty  feeling  in  the  stomach,  and  a  wish  to  run 
home  to  be  with  trusted  relatives.  Repeated  attacks  lead  to agoraphobia,  as  patients 
avoid  locations  where  panic  attacks  have  occurred.  Agoraphobics  also  typically 
avoid  certain  other  situations,  including  wide  open  spaces,  being  alone,  being  far 
from  home,  and  being  in  any  situation  in  which  they  might  be,  or  feel,  trapped. 
Cannon’s  “fight  or  flight”  response  is  an  almost  perfect  description  of  the  signs 
and  symptoms  of  a  panic  attack.  22 The  rapid  heart  rate,  pale  skin  as  blood  is 
shunted  to  muscle,  the  cooling  sweat,  the  hyperventilation  to  oxygenate  the  blood- 
all  are  adaptive  preparations  for  fight  or  flight.  But  fight  with  or  flight  from  what? 
From  predators  and  hostile  humans.  Not  only  are  the  characteristics  of  the  reflex 
consistent  with  this,  but  the  environmental  precipitants  are  too.  Of  course  the 
organism  is made  apprehensive  by  wide  open  spaces  without  trees,  and  by  locations 
in  which  it  may  be  trapped,  so  are  most  prey  animals.  The  momentary  immobility 
at  the  onset  of  danger  is  a  camouflage  device  used  by  mice  and  rabbits  as  well  as 
primates.  Why  flee  home  and  seek  out  trusted  relatives?  Every  social  animal  does 
the  same.  Why  are  women  more  susceptible?  Probably  because  they  are  usually 
more  vulnerable.  Why  should  severe  apprehension  result  from  one-time  learning? 
Individuals  who  had  no  fear  when  they  saw  a lion  for  the  second  time  on  the  open 
plain  did  not  survive. 
As  psychophysiological  capacities  intimately  related  to  reproduction,  sexual  re- 
sponses  are  particularly  susceptible  to  evolutionary  analysis.  Every  book  on  sexual 
disorders  contains  extensive  discussion  about  the  causes  and  treatment  of premature 
ejaculation  in  men  and  delayed  orgasm  in  women.  By  why  do  men  usually  reach 
orgasm  more  rapidly  than  women?  Well,  what  if  it  were  reversed?  A  woman  who 
consistently  reached  orgasm  quickly  and  stopped  coitus  before  her  mate  reached 
orgasm  would  rarely  reproduce.  A  man  whose  orgasm  was  consistently  delayed 
would  also  be  at  a  reproductive  disadvantage.  Genes  that  cause  such  tendencies 
are  quickly  eliminated.  Natural  selection  did  not  shape  us for  harmony  and  pleasure, 
but,  inevitably,  for  effective  reproduction.  That  anxiety  causes  impotence  is common 
knowledge.  The  reason  may  be that  copulating  couples  who  continued  when  danger 
appeared,  had  even  shorter  lives  than  their  contemporaries. 580  RANDOLPH  M.  NESSE 
These  examples  are  few and  incomplete.  The  specific  predictions  that  offer  tests 
for each hypothesis  deserve more  detailed  discussion,  and additional  examples  could 
consider  the evolutionary  significance  of other  psychiatric  symptoms,  the emotions, 
the personality  types,  and  the mental  structures.  But here  the  goal must  be simply 
to demonstrate  the legitimacy  and importance  of seeking ultimate  explanations  and 
the ability  of evolutionary  theory  to help  us find  these  explanations.  At  this  point, 
evolutionary  psychobiology  offers  many  new questions  and  few firm  answers.  But 
by  recognizing  the  evolutionary  origins  of  human  nature,  and  by  considering  the 
adaptive  significance  of every  human  capacity,  psychiatry  may  gradually  come  to 
share  the  firm  foundation  that  evolution  provides  for  all of natural  science. 
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